[black mamba1]

Nothing like some facts to counter dogma
The Russian Naval Threat Is Overrated
The threat posed by the Russian submarine fleet has been dramatically overstated by supporters of the Seawolf. As it currently stands, and for the foreseeable future, the Russian submarine fleet poses no significant challenge to the U.S. Navy. Two main factors contribute to this. First, only the "Improved Akula / Akula II and the new Severodvinsk SSNs have capabilities comparable with the U.S. Los Angeles and Seawolf attack submarines. All other Russian subs possess significantly weaker capabilities. (Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997)
Current Russian Attack Submarine FleetClassTypeNumber
(1996)Number
(2006 est.)Avg.
AgeWeaponsStatusCharlie IISSGN2016SS-N-9; SS-N-15; 6
torpedo tubes (18
torpedoes)no more
plannedEcho IISSGN2029SS-N-12; 8 torpedo
tubes (20 torpedoes)no more
plannedOscar ISSGN2014SS-N-9; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 6 torpedo
tubes (24 torpedoes)no more
plannedOscar IISSGN11+2136SS-N-9; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 6 torpedo
tubes (24 torpedoes)building
1 / yearAkula ISSN1266SS-N-21; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 8 torpedo
tubes (40 torpedoes)no more
plannedAkula II/
Improved
AkulaSSN1+451SS-N-21; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 14 torpedo
tubes (40 torpedoes)building
1-2 / yearSeverodvinskSSN/
SSGN0+2 (5)5N/ASS-CX-5 Sapless
Sub Harpoon type; 8
VLS; SS-N-15;
SS-N-162 under
construction,
5 plannedSierra ISSN2010SS-N-21; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 8 torpedo
tubes (40 torpedoes)no more
plannedSierra ISSN205SS-N-21; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 8 torpedo
tubes (40 torpedoes)no more
plannedVictor ISSN20226 torpedo tubes
(18 torpedoes)no more
plannedVictor IISSN3021SS-N-15; SS-N-16;
6 torpedo tubes
(24 torpedoes)no more
plannedVictor IIISSN26813SS-N-21; SS-N-15;
SS-N-16; 6 torpedo
tubes (24 torpedoes)no more
plannedYankee
NotchSSN,
ex-SSBN30N/ASS-N-21; 6 torpedo
tubes (18 torpedoes)no more
plannedFoxtrotSS603110 torpedo tubes
(22 torpedoes)no more
plannedKiloSSK24248SA-N-5/8; 6
torpedo tubes
(18 torpedoes)building 2-3/
year for
exportTangoSSK1616186 torpedo tubes
(18 torpedoes)no more
planned
Classes: SSGN:Guided missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN:Attack submarine, nuclear-powered; SSBN: Ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-powered; SS:Submarine, conventionally-powered; SSK: Submarine, ASW capability, conventionally-powered.
Number is given in format of # Active + # Building (Total # Planned).
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997; Fleet size and composition for 2006 is Author's estimate.)
And second, a large portion of the Russian sub fleet is approaching block obsolescence, and will have to be retired early next century. As an example, the Victor III class currently makes up a major portion of the Russian SSN fleet. The Navy has, in past projections, assumed a service life of 25 years for the Victor III. A more realistic service life estimate is 20-22 years. Ten of the current 26 Victor IIIs were built before 1980, and 21 were built by 1985. By 2003, at most eight Victor IIIs will still be in service (possibly as few as five). (Source: International Center for Technology Assessment estimate) Given current Russian financial trends, it seems very unlikely that these losses can be replaced. Further cuts in the Russian defense budget are inevitable. These cuts will undoubtedly affect both the force structure and future procurement in the submarine fleet.

SSN-23 Is Not Needed to Preserve the Industrial Base
SSN-23 is not needed to preserve the nuclear submarine industrial base until the next class of nuclear submarines can be built for several reasons. First, General Dynamic's Electric Boat Division in Groton, Connecticut has already been awarded contracts for the first two Seawolf class, two Los Angeles class, and four Ohio ballistic missile submarines. The construction of these vessels could be "drawn out" until FY98, when construction of the first NSSN will begin.
Second, given current and near-term Navy procurement needs, preserving two shipyards (at both Groton and Newport News) is unrealistic. There simply is insufficient new construction to support two shipyards. This redundancy does not currently provide competition because Tenneco's Newport News Shipbuilding is not being allowed to compete for NSSN contracts until well into the next century when (and if) two NSSNs are produced annually. Newport News has the capacity to produce four nuclear subs per year. With an average service life of 30 years, Newport News could support a fleet of 120 subs, well above the 45-55 attack subs called for in the "Bottom Up Review." And, the Navy has been content to allow a single shipyard to produce nuclear aircraft carriers. A similar policy for nuclear submarines should be adopted. (Source: Statement of Cindy Williams, Assistant Director of the National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, on Attack Submarine Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 16 May 1995.)
And third, it is not true that most of the skills needed for nuclear submarine construction would "wither away" and have to be reconstituted if no more subs were produced until construction on the NSSN begins. Overhauls and repair work on existing subs, along with "drawing out" existing sub construction, could provide much of the practice and experience needed in these critical skills. In addition, nearly 80% of the skills needed for working on nuclear subs can be found in nuclear aircraft workers.

Seawolf's Missions and Capabilities Are Not in Line with the Navy's Current Needs
Seawolf is a weapons platform that will be performing missions and facing threats it was not designed for. Seawolf was conceived and designed during the Cold War for deep water ("blue") confrontations with the Soviet Navy.
The Navy's ...From the Sea White Paper recognizes that the strategic landscape in the post-Cold war era has changed, and that the Navy will be increasingly involved in operations in the littoral or "near land" areas of the world, like the Persian Gulf. The littoral is characterized by a number of unique challenges: shallow, congested waterways, well-known to the adversary; mines; coastal missile and artillery batteries; sea-skimming cruise missiles; and tactical ballistic missiles. As ...From the Sea states, these littoral threats "tax the capabilities of our current systems and force structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the seas."
The Seawolf has not been designed to operate in this environment, nor was it designed to perform against small, advanced diesel subs in these difficult conditions. Seawolf is not the kind of submarine that should be designed in the post-Cold War era for post-Cold War missions. It is, instead, an expensive relic that has little place in the modern U.S. submarine fleet.

Alternatives for Enhancing the U.S. Sub Fleet
The Bottom Up Review called for an attack submarine force of 45-55 vessels. To achieve this force level, the Navy will retire all pre-Los Angeles class subs, and will retire the first ten Los Angeles class subs when they are due for their first overhauls, at about the 15 year mark of their 30 year service life cycles. Thereafter, Los Angeles class subs will be retired early, and the Seawolf and NSSN classes will be constructed, to maintain the attack fleet at approximately 55 vessels.
Current U.S. Attack submarine FleetClassNumberUnit CostAvg. AgeWeaponsStatusLos Angeles57+1 (62)$741
Million10Harpoon & Tomahawk
missiles; Mk 48 torpedoes; 4
torpedo tubes, VLS1 under construction, 4 more plannedSturgeon18$584
Million25Harpoon & Tomahawk
missiles; Mk 48 torpedoes; 4
torpedo tubesno more plannedNarwhal1$944
Million27Harpoon & Tomahawk
missiles; Mk 48 torpedoes; 4
torpedo tubesno more plannedBenjamin
Franklin2$712
Million30Mk 48 torpedoes; 4 torpedo
tubesno more planned
(SEAL special
operations)Seawolf1+2 (3)$4.3 BillionN/AHarpoon & Tomahawk
missiles; Mk 48 torpedoes; 8
torpedo tubes2 more under
constructionNSSN0+4 (4)N/AN/AHarpoon & Tomahawk
missiles; Mk 48 torpedoes;
torpedo tubes; VLS4 planned
Number is given in format of # Active + # Building (Total # Planned).
Unit costs are given in FY95 Dollars.
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997; unit costs are given in Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports Program Acquisition Cost Summaries and by Sue Philly, U.S. Navy Public Affairs.)
There are other, more readily available, and less expensive options for enhancing the size and capabilities of the attack submarine fleet, without building the third Seawolf. The Los Angeles class is, arguably, the best and most cost-effective nuclear attack sub in the world, and relying on this proven technology for a few more years would not decrease U.S. sub superiority. The Navy should, first, use the Los Angeles vessels for their entire life cycles, instead of retiring them after they have served only half of their useful service lives, and constructing SSN-23 and the NSSNs. Defering production of SSN-23 and the NSSNs while retaining all the Los Angeles for their full service lives (or even extending the service lives of the Los Angeles class) would save the Navy billions of dollars without sacrificing U.S. submarine superiority.
Research and development for the next generation of attack subs should continue. New submarine hulls are not needed now. Theses can be developed early in the next century when the Los Angeles class is approaching block obsolescence. In effect, a generation of submarine technology (SSN-23 / the NSSN) can be "skipped," with little detriment to U.S. sub superiority. When that next generation of sub is designed, the Navy must seek a sub design that is smaller, cheaper, and geared more toward littoral warfare than either the Seawolf or the NSSN. The Navy cannot continue to design and produce subs that cost more than $4 billion each.
The Navy should seriously consider designing an inexpensive, diesel-powered class of attack subs that would be dedicated to littoral operations. With the emergence of the so-called "air-independent propulsion" (AIP) systems now being developed, the main military objection to conventionally-powered subs will soon disappear. These AIP systems will allow nonnuclear subs to remain submerged for long periods of time without snorkeling. (Conventionally-powered subs are easily detectable by ASW techniques while they are snorkeling.) A diesel-powered AIP class of subs would provide a low-cost sub that is specifically designed for the operations that the Navy is most likely to be involved in.

CDI Conclusion: Seawolf Is a Prime Example of Excessive and Wasteful Spending
Seawolf is an excellent example of a Cold War weapons system that is not currently needed. It is not justified militarily, given the threats that the U.S. will be facing in the foreseeable future. Neither is it necessary to maintain the nuclear submarine industrial base. Without SSN-23, the proposed U.S. attack submarine fleet will consist of two Seawolf class and 57 Los Angeles class. Five more Los Angeles class subs are currently in production, and the lead vessel in the class need not be retired until 2006. A third Seawolf is unnecessary to maintain U.S. submarine superiority. The U.S.' submarine fleet is, by far, the most powerful in the world, and it will continue to be, even without the third Seawolf.